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Abstract 
Intuition and moral beliefs are used unconsciously in every day decision making, with 
intuition being the main decision maker and moral foundations providing reasoning for a decision. 
Intuition refers to the gut feelings a person may have about a situation or decision. Moral 
foundations refer to themes of morality that individuals may rely on. Under varying circumstances, 
different moral beliefs may be more salient and important when making a judgement. Given the role 
that both of these play in everyday decision making, this study aimed to explore the relationship 
between the three types of intuition (holistic, inferential, and affective) and the five moral 
foundations (harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/degradation) and how different thinking styles, namely analytic and intuitive thinking styles, 
would influence the moral foundations that are relied on when making moral decisions. It was 
hypothesized that the three types of intuition would be related to the sanctity/degradation moral 
foundation and that these relationships would be positive. Furthermore, it was expected that 
participants under cognitive load would rely more on individualizing moral values when making 
moral judgements. Results showed the strongest relationship between the harm/care moral 
foundation and affective intuition. Thinking styles did not affect the moral foundations that 
participants relied on when making moral decisions.  
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Examining Moral Foundations and Thinking Styles 
Making decisions is an important aspect of our lives. Some decisions require more overt 
consideration, such as determining what to eat for lunch that day, while other decisions are more 
covert, such as determining which food item to start eating first. Regardless of the nature of a 
decision, different cognitive processes are involved and personal beliefs can influence the final 
decision that is made. Personal beliefs elicit emotional responses within people that can affect their 
judgments. Moral foundations, deeply held beliefs associated with morality that influence 
judgements, are related to personal beliefs and may be relied on for decision making in different 
ways when in diverse situations (Haidt, 2012). Dual process theory is discussed here along with 
research on moral foundations and how they relate to intuition. 
Different thinking styles, ways of thinking that vary based on the cognitive processes being 
used, may result in different decisions being made (Evans, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Given 
that both thinking styles and moral beliefs affect people’s decisions and judgements, it is possible 
that the two would be related. This could go beyond a simple relationship. Thinking styles may 
affect the different moral foundations people rely on when making judgements or decisions.  
Dual Process Theory 
 The dual process theory states that there are two different cognitive processes, Type 1 and 
Type 2 (Evans, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 processing is automatic and quick, and 
often occurs without conscious awareness. This type of processing does not require working memory 
and is able to handle a higher capacity of information. Type 2 processing, on the other hand, is a 
much slower and analytical type of processing, and requires conscious effort. This processing style 
requires working memory and cannot handle a large capacity of information. Given this requirement 
of working memory for analytical processing, it is clear that individuals who are put under a 
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cognitive load would be forced to rely more on Type 1 processing because they would not have the 
cognitive resources that are necessary to complete Type 2 processing.   
 Intuition. Intuition is understood to be a form of Type 1, automatic processing (Evans, 
2010). Numerous definitions of intuition have been proposed over the years (Abernathy & Hamm, 
1995) and it has been noted that most of these definitions explain intuition in terms of what it is not 
rather than what it is (Epstein, 2010). Pretz et al. (2014) overcame this trend by identifying intuition 
as an initial gut reaction or the immediate feelings people have about the decision options that are 
present in a given situation. This intuitive knowledge comes about unconsciously and people are not 
able to recognize where this knowledge originates from (Epstein, 2010). 
 Types of Intuition. Intuition can further be defined in terms of different types of intuition. 
Pretz and Totz (2007) identified three unique types of intuition: holistic intuition, inferential 
intuition, and affective intuition. Holistic intuition is defined as non-analytic judgements that are 
made based on the holistic integration of various information and cues. These judgements are not 
obvious in nature. Inferential intuition is defined as a process that was once analytic but has become 
automatic in nature as a result of practice. This process is based on inferences that have been made. 
Finally, affective intuition is defined as emotionally driven judgements based on a person’s 
emotional reaction to a given situation. 
 Analytical Thinking. Analytical thinking is a form of Type 2 processing that involves 
thinking through intuitive decisions and possibly overriding those thoughts or decisions (Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). This style of thinking is slower and more deliberate, and involves 
more cognitive resources. A similar term, cognitive reflection, has been used to refer to this thinking 
style as well. Frederick (2005) defines cognitive reflection as the ability to move past initial thoughts 
and refrain from responding to a question or problem with the first response that comes to mind. 
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This is often measured through the use of the Cognitive Reflection Task in which correct answers to 
three questions can only be arrived at through analytical thinking and Type 2 processing.  
Moral Foundations 
Moral foundations are deep-set beliefs that people hold and can influence people’s 
judgements and decision making. Haidt (2012) identified five moral foundations: harm/care, 
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. The harm/care 
moral foundation reflects a person’s sensitivity towards cruelty and harm. The fairness/cheating 
moral foundation is driven by whether or not someone thinks another person will be good to work 
and collaborate with. The loyalty/betrayal moral foundation focuses on a person’s assessment of the 
extent to which others will be a team player and support their own in-group. The 
authority/subversion moral foundation refers to a person’s assessment of ranks and positions of 
authority and acting appropriately according to those ranks or positions. Finally, the 
sanctity/degradation moral foundation reflects beliefs that some acts are disgusting and unnatural 
and are, therefore, immoral. These sanctity/degradation beliefs regarding purity help bind people 
together.  
 Pennycook et al. (2015) categorized the five moral foundations into two different groupings. 
Individualizing moral values include the harm/care and fairness/cheating moral foundations whereas 
binding moral values include the loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation 
moral foundations. These moral foundations can be used to explain how various cultures have 
different views and reliance on morality (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and the moral foundations that 
people rely on the most are different for people of varying political backgrounds (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2008). Liberals depends mostly on individualizing moral values whereas conservatives 
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depend mostly on binding moral values (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
Pennycook et al., 2015).  
Moral Foundations and Intuition 
 The five moral foundations are closely related to intuition with certain relationships being 
stronger than the others. Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, and Fugelsang (2014) noted a negative 
relationship between binding moral values, namely the loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/degradation moral foundations. Some researchers have gone beyond looking at simple 
relationships and have examined the effects that thinking styles may have on moral judgements. 
Tinghög et al. (2016) asked participants to respond to moral judgement scenarios while under 
cognitive load, inducing an intuitive thinking style. They noted that an intuitive thinking style did 
not influence participants’ responses on the moral judgement scenarios. Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, and Cohen (2008) conducted a similar study in which participants under 
cognitive load responded to high-conflict moral dilemmas. However, in contrast to the findings of 
Tinghög et al. (2016), Greene et al. (2008) noted that cognitive load increased participants’ response 
times to utilitarian moral judgements, demonstrating that cognitive load can interfere with moral 
judgements. Similarly, Björklund (2003) observed that participants under a time constraint, and 
thereby using a more intuitive thinking style, used more justice-oriented reasoning for moral 
decisions. These studies indicate that thinking styles may have an effect on moral judgements, but it 
is not clear exactly what that effect is or how strong it may be. 
Haidt (2012) argues that, when making moral decisions, intuition is the first step in the 
decision process and a person’s moral beliefs are used to later justify the judgments or decisions the 
person initially made. He found this pattern to be the strongest when feelings of disrespect and 
disgust were involved. This relationship is not necessarily one way, though. It has been shown that 
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morality can affect intuition. People who were primed to have an unconscious moral identity 
reported decreased beliefs in the ethicality of the business field (Leavitt, Zhu, & Aquino, 2016). 
Furthermore, these subtle priming cues were sufficient to change the intuitions people had about 
business. Other authors have noted how specific moral foundations may influence intuitions. Schnall 
and Cannon (2012) suggested that people’s moral feelings of disgust influence the way they perceive 
others’ characters. Physiologically, they noted that, when people are morally offended by a situation 
or decision, the situation or decisions can elicit an immediate emotional response which can later 
affect their judgements. Two studies were conducted in response to this literature. The first study 
looked simply at the relationship between moral foundations and types of intuition. The second 
study examined how different thinking styles may influence the moral foundations that people rely 
on when making decisions. 
Study 1 
 Given the role that both intuition and moral foundations can play in making judgements and 
how morality can influence intuition, it is important to examine the relationship between moral 
foundations and types of intuition. Currently, no studies have looked specifically at this relationship. 
As such, this study aimed to inspect the relationship between moral foundations and types of 
intuition. It was hypothesized that the sanctity/degradation moral foundation would be related to the 
three types of intuition and that these relationships would be positive. 
Participants 
 91 undergraduate students at Elizabethtown College participated in this study. Participants 
were between the ages of 18 and 22 years (M=19.81, SD=1.18) and 70.89% were female. Students 
who were enrolled in a General Psychology course received 0.5 credit hours for participating in this 
study.  
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Materials 
 Moral Foundations Questionnaire. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, 
& Nosek, 2008; see Appendix A) consisted of 32 different statements that participants were asked to 
rate. These statements assessed how much each participant relied on the five moral foundations: 
harm/care (“Whether or not someone suffered emotionally”), fairness/cheating (“Whether or not 
some people were treated differently than others”), loyalty/betrayal (“Whether or not someone’s 
action showed love for his or her country”), authority/subversion (“Whether or not someone showed 
a lack of respect for authority”), and sanctity/degradation (“Whether or not someone violated 
standards of purity and decency”). The first 16 statements were to be rated on a scale from 0 (not at 
all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant) based on how much participants consider these statements 
when thinking and making decisions. The final 16 statements were to be rated based on how much 
participants agree with the statements on a scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The 
sums of the items on the different subscales were computed. Higher scores on the different moral 
foundations subscales indicated more reliance on those particular foundations.  
 Types of Intuition Scale. The Types of Intuition Scale (Pretz et al., 2014; see Appendix B) 
consisted of 23 statements that assessed how much participants relied on holistic intuition (“When 
tackling a new project, I concentrate on big ideas rather than the details”), inferential intuition (“I 
trust my intuitions, especially in familiar situations”), and affective intuition (“I prefer to use my 
emotional hunches to deal with a problem, rather than thinking about it”) when making judgements. 
Participants were asked to rate each statement on a scale from 1 (definitely false) to 5 (definitely 
true) based on how true the statement is of themselves when they are making decisions or 
judgements. The sum of the items for each subscale were calculated. Higher scores on the different 
types of intuition subscales indicated more reliance on that particular type of intuition. 
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Procedure  
 Participants read and signed a consent form prior to beginning the study. Participants then 
completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) and the Types of 
Intuition Scale (Pretz et al., 2014). Finally, participants completed demographic information 
regarding age, gender, and major of study.  
Results 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. Pearson Correlations were 
computed for the five moral foundations and three types of intuition. All five moral foundations 
were significantly positively correlated with each other with the exception of the fairness/cheating 
and sanctity/degradation foundations which were not significantly correlated with one another. 
Within the types of intuition, only holistic and inferential intuition were significantly related (r=.33, 
p=.003). It was hypothesized that the types of intuition and the sanctity/degradation moral 
foundation would be positively correlated. This hypothesis was partially supported. Affective 
intuition was not significantly correlated with the sanctity/degradation foundation (r=.15, p=.2). 
However, the sanctity/degradation foundation was significantly negatively correlated with both 
holistic intuition (r=-.23, p=.044) and inferential intuition (r=-.24, p=.031). Contrary to the 
hypothesis, these relationships were not positive. The harm/care foundation was positively correlated 
with affective intuition (r=.45, p<.001) while the fairness/cheating foundation was positively 
correlated with inferential intuition (r=.31, p=.006). 
 Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test the predictive abilities of the types of 
intuition on the different moral foundations and of the moral foundations on the different types of 
intuition (see Table 2). In line with the correlations, the sanctity/degradation foundation was an 
almost significant predictor of holistic intuition (β=-.27, p=.056) and was a significant predictor of 
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inferential intuition (β=-.28, p=.039), but was not a significant predictor of affective intuition (β=.11, 
p=.411). However, neither holistic intuition (β=-.20, p=.092) nor inferential intuition (β=-.18, 
p=.128) were significant predictors of the sanctity/degradation foundation. Further in line with the 
correlations, affective intuition was a significant predictor of the harm/care foundation (β=.46, 
p<.001) and the harm/care foundation was a significant predictor of affective intuition (β=.63, 
p<.001). Finally, and again in line with the correlations, inferential intuition was a significant 
predictor of the fairness/cheating foundation (β=.35, p=.002) and the fairness/cheating foundation 
was an almost significant predictor of inferential intuition (β=.29, p=.051). 
Discussion 
 Overall, there were few significant relationships between the moral foundations and types of 
intuition. The strongest relationship seems to have been between the harm/care foundation and 
affective intuition. This is understandable given that affective intuition focuses on a person’s 
emotional response and the harm/care foundation refers to how people react to suffering and cruelty 
(Haidt, 2012; Pretz & Totz, 2007). People who are in tune with their emotions may have stronger 
emotional reactions when viewing or thinking about someone suffering. Given that liberals rely 
heavily on the care/harm foundation, it would be interesting to see if people with liberal beliefs rely 
more on affective intuition than holistic and inferential intuition (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
 The hypothesis that the types of intuition would be related to the sanctity/degradation  
moral foundation and that these relationships would be positive was partially supported. There was 
no significant relationship between affective intuition and the sanctity/degradation foundation. The 
sanctity/degradation foundation was significantly correlated with holistic and inferential intuition, 
but both of these relationships were negative. Given Haidt’s (2012) argument that intuitions come 
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first and moral reasoning is used second to explain a person’s judgement, these findings suggests 
that individuals who rely more on holistic and inferential types of intuition do not rely on the 
sanctity/degradation moral foundation as heavily and do not use the sanctity/degradation foundation 
to explain their decisions and judgements. These negative relationships can be explained by the fact 
that holistic and inferential intuition rely more on cognitive processes rather than emotional 
processes, while the sanctity/degradation moral foundation relies heavily on emotions.  
 The moral foundations were best at predicting affective intuition, although this seems to have 
been caused by affective intuition’s strong relationship with the harm/care foundation. No other 
foundation was a significant predictor of affective intuition. Similarly, the types of intuition were 
best at predicting the harm/care foundation, again with affective intuition being the only significant 
predictor. None of the types of intuition were significant predictors of the loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, or sanctity/degradation foundations. Only inferential intuition was a significant 
predictor of the fairness/cheating foundation. This can be explained by the fact that both inferential 
intuition and deciding whether or not a person would be good to collaborate with involve cognitive 
processes rather than emotional processes. 
 Given that this study was part of a larger survey, it is possible that participants experienced 
fatigue and did not spend much time on each question, or may have been primed by a previous 
questionnaire. As such, future research should examine these variables in a separate study and 
should counterbalance which questionnaire is completed first. This study was conducted using a 
largely American population. Given that moral foundations differ across countries and cultures 
(Haidt & Joseph, 2004), different results may be found if other countries and cultures were 
examined. Perhaps future studies could look at how types of intuition differ across cultures and 
whether or not that difference affects the relationships between the moral foundations and the types 
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of intuition. Future research should also further examine the relationship between the harm/care 
foundation and affective intuition to determine if there are any mediating factors. Finally, this study 
was based on correlational data and did not involve any manipulation. This was taken into account 
when conducting Study 2. 
Study 2 
Study 1 showed some significant relationships between moral foundations and intuition. 
Different thinking styles, ways of thinking that vary based on the cognitive processes being used, 
may result in different decisions being made (Evans, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The current 
study aimed to examine the effects that intuitive and analytic thinking styles may have on the moral 
foundations that people rely on when making decisions. Thus far, no work has been done regarding 
how people’s reliance on different moral foundations may change depending on the thinking style 
they are using. It is expected that the results reported in Study 1 noting a positive relationship 
between affective intuition and the harm/care moral foundation will be replicated in this study 
(Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, negative relationships between scores on the Cognitive Reflection 
Task (Frederick, 2005) and the binding moral foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, 
and sanctity/degradation) are expected, replicating the results discussed by Pennycook et al. (2014; 
Hypothesis 2). Given that the harm/care moral foundation is considered to be an individualizing 
moral value (Pennycook et al., 2015), it is predicted that people who are using an intuitive thinking 
style will rely more on individualizing moral values rather than binding moral values (Hypothesis 3). 
Finally, it is predicted that people who are induced with an analytic thinking style will not differ in 
their pre- and posttest moral foundations scores, but that people who are induced with an intuitive 
thinking style will have scores that shift more towards individualizing moral values in their posttest 
moral foundations scores as compared to their pretest moral foundations scores (Hypothesis 4).  
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Methods 
Participants 
 Thirty-four undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 21 (M=19.09, SD=.996, 
85.3% female) at Elizabethtown College participated in this study. Participants received 0.5 credit 
hours towards their General Psychology course for their participation. 
Materials 
 The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) and the Types of 
Intuition Scale (Pretz et al., 2014) administered in Study 1 were used again in Study 2. 
Cognitive Reflection Task. The Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005; see Appendix C) 
assessed how well participants were able to cognitively reflect on a problem and refrain from giving 
their first, intuitive answer on three word problems. These short word problems involved some 
simple mathematical calculations and had an obvious, but incorrect, intuitive response (“A bat and a 
ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”). 
Correct responses were obtained through analytical thinking. Participants received a point for each 
question they answered correctly. If participants remembered the answer from prior experience, that 
question was omitted from their score. A higher percentage of unfamiliar answers participants got 
correct indicated more cognitive reflection and analytical thinking.  
 Moral Scenarios. The three moral scenarios (see Appendix D) incorporated both an 
individualizing and binding moral foundation in each scenario (“Imagine that you are in the Army. 
Your commanding officer tells you that you must leave an injured soldier behind in order to make it 
to your next destination on time. You know that this soldier is suffering and will likely die without 
any medical assistance. You decide to…”). Two possible responses to the scenario, one response 
representing an individualizing moral foundation action (“help the injured soldier”) and the other 
Moral Foundations and Thinking Styles                                          14 
 
response representing a binding moral foundation action (“follow the orders from your commanding 
officer”), were placed on either end of a four-point sliding scale. Participants were asked to move the 
scale to represent how they would behave in that scenario. Higher scores indicated a tendency to act 
based on individualizing moral values. 
Procedure 
Participants completed this study on a computer and were randomly assigned to either a 
control (analytic) or cognitive load (intuitive) condition. Participants first completed the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008), the Types of Intuition Scale ((Pretz et 
al., 2014), and the Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005). Participants were asked to alert the 
researcher after finishing these tasks and before moving on to the next task, completing the moral 
scenarios and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire for a second time. The participants assigned to 
the intuitive condition completed the rest of the tasks and questionnaires under cognitive load, 
thereby inducing intuitive thinking. Cognitive load was induced by asking participants to listen to a 
recording of random numbers being spoken and make a tally mark for every prime number that was 
said. The participants assigned to the analytic condition completed the rest of the tasks and 
questionnaires under the same conditions they had completed the first part of the study, allowing 
them the cognitive freedom to think about their answers. Finally, participants reported demographic 
information, including age and gender, and were thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of the measures are reported in Table 3. Cronbach’s 
alpha was computed for all of the variables. The six-item harm/care pretest moral foundation 
subscale (α=.620), six-item fairness/cheating pretest moral foundation subscale (α=.684), six item 
loyalty/betrayal pretest moral foundation subscale (α=.549), six-item authority/subversion pretest 
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moral foundation subscale (α=.615), and six-item sanctity/degradation pretest moral foundation 
subscale (α=.691) were all not reliable. The seven-item holistic intuition subscale (α=.565) and 
eight-item inferential intuition subscale (α=.659) were not reliable. However, the eight-item affective 
intuition subscale (α=.736) was reliable. The six-item harm/care posttest moral foundation subscale 
(α=.728), six-item loyalty/betrayal posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.728), six-item 
authority/subversion posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.749), and six-item sanctity/degradation 
posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.775) were all reliable. However, the six-item 
fairness/cheating posttest moral foundation subscale (α=.578) was not reliable. Given the lack of 
reliability of some of the measures, the results of this study should be considered with caution.  
Pearson’s r correlations were computed for the five moral foundations pretest, the three types 
of intuition, and cognitive reflection. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, affective intuition was not correlated 
with the harm/care moral foundation (r=-.167, p=.344). Furthermore, cognitive reflection scores 
were not significantly correlated with the loyalty/betrayal (r=-.133, p=.536), authority/subversion 
(r=-.172, p=.422), and sanctity/degradation (r=-.108, p=.616) moral foundations, contrasting 
Hypothesis 2.  
It was hypothesized that participants under a cognitive load and therefore using an intuitive 
thinking style would rely on individualizing moral foundations (Hypothesis 3). An independent 
samples t-test was conducted to compare moral scenario scores in in the control condition and under 
cognitive load. Differing from Hypothesis 3, there was not a significant difference in moral scenario 
scores between participants in the control condition (M=9.177, SD=.951) and participants under 
cognitive load (M=9.765, SD=1.393; t(32)=1.438, p=.160). Participants in the control condition 
relied on individualizing moral foundations as much as participants under cognitive load.  
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Factorial ANOVAs on moral foundations are reported in Table 4. It was hypothesized that 
participants’ moral foundations scores would not change from pre- to posttest when they were using 
an analytic thinking style, but participants’ pre- and posttest scores would shift towards 
individualizing moral foundations when they were under cognitive load and thereby using an 
intuitive thinking style (Hypothesis 4). A 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load) 
factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of time of test and condition and the 
interaction effect between time of test and condition on harm/care moral foundation scores. Both 
main effects were not significant (all ps>.05). The interaction effect between time of test and 
condition was also not significant (Λ=.996, F(1, 32)=.126, p=.725), not confirming Hypothesis 4. A 
2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare 
the main effects of time of test and condition and the interaction effect between time of test and 
condition on fairness/cheating moral foundation scores. Both main effects were not significant ( all 
ps>.05). The interaction effect between time of test and condition was also not significant (Λ=.952, 
F(1, 32)=1.622, p=.212), contrasting Hypothesis 4.  
A 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was conducted to 
compare the main effects of time of test and condition and the interaction effect between time of test 
and condition on loyalty/betrayal moral foundation scores. The main effect of time was significant 
(Λ=.795, F(1, 32)=8.244, p=.007), indicating that pretest loyalty/betrayal moral foundation scores 
(M=15.441, SD=3.807) were significantly higher than posttest scores (M=14.118, SD=5.080). The 
main effect of condition was not significant (F(1, 32)=.329, p=.570). The interaction effect between 
time of test and condition was also not significant (Λ=.999, F(1, 32)=.037, p=.849), not supporting 
Hypothesis 4. A 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 (control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was 
conducted to compare the main effects of time of test and condition and the interaction effect 
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between time of test and condition on authority/subversion moral foundation scores. The main effect 
of time was significant (Λ=.815, F(1, 32)=7.248, p=.011), indicating that pretest 
authority/subversion moral foundation scores (M=15.824, SD=3.966) were significantly higher than 
posttest scores (M=14.824, SD=4.988). The main effect of condition was not significant (F(1, 
32)=.386, p=.539). The interaction effect between time of test and condition was also not significant 
(Λ=.988, F(1, 32)=.401, p=.531), not confirming Hypothesis 4. Finally, a 2 (pretest vs. posttest) X 2 
(control vs. cognitive load) factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of time of 
test and condition and the interaction effect between time of test and condition on 
sanctity/degradation moral foundation scores. The main effect of time was significant (Λ=.765, F(1, 
32)=9.815, p=.004), indicating that pretest sanctity/degradation moral foundation scores (M=13.559, 
SD=4.627) were significantly higher than posttest scores(M=12.441, SD=5.264). The main effect of 
condition was not significant (F(1, 32)=.005, p=.945). The interaction effect between time of test 
and condition was also not significant (Λ=.992, F(1, 32)=.245, p=.624), contrasting Hypothesis 4. 
Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to examine the effects that intuitive and analytic thinking styles 
have on moral foundations. Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, which predicted a positive relationship 
between affective intuition and the harm/care moral foundation and negative relationships between 
cognitive reflection scores and the pretest loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/degradation moral foundations respectively, were not confirmed. None of these predicted 
relationships were significant. These results contrast the relationships previously noted in Study 1 
and by Pennycook et al. (2014). Given that the previous authors had larger sample sizes than was 
obtained in this study, it is possible that the results of the current study were limited by the small 
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sample size. A larger sample size in the present study may have yielded the predicted results in 
relation to the first two hypotheses.  
The third hypothesis, predicting that participants under cognitive load would rely more on 
individualizing moral foundations than participants not under cognitive load, was also not 
confirmed. While the behavioral moral scenarios measure was a strength of the study, perhaps the 
cognitive load task did not correctly induce intuitive thinking, thereby limiting participants’ reliance 
on individualizing moral values when responding to the moral scenarios. These results have 
implications suggesting that people will make the same moral decisions regardless of the style of 
thinking they are using and the cognitive load they are facing. 
Finally, the fourth hypothesis, expecting that participants in the control group would not 
differ in their pre- and posttest moral foundations scores but that participants under cognitive load 
would have scores that shift more towards individualizing moral values in their posttest moral 
foundations scores as compared to their pretest moral foundations scores was not confirmed. This 
observation offers some support for the results noted by Tinghög et al. (2016) that intuitive thinking 
styles did not influence moral judgements. Furthermore, these results contrast those noted by Greene 
et al. (2008) and Björklund (2003) which indicated that cognitive load and time restraints have an 
effect on moral judgements and moral reasoning. Manipulation checks were not used in this study, 
presenting a limitation. Although attempting to induce a specific thinking style is a strength of this 
study, it is conceivable that the cognitive load placed on participants in this study was not enough to 
induce a truly intuitive thinking style. It is also possible that the moral scenarios induced a different, 
unintended thinking style and caused participants to rely on different moral foundation. Future 
research should experiment with other methods of inducing cognitive load and include manipulation 
checks to ensure that the cognitive load had the desired effect.  
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Unexpectedly, it was noted that participants had higher scores on the pretest loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation moral foundations subscales compared to the posttest 
subscales. These results have implications that reliance on binding moral values may decrease over 
time. It is plausible that participants recognized the questions on the posttest from the pretest and, as 
a result, did not spend as much time or effort answering the posttest questions. Future research 
should attempt to control for this recognition by changing the order in which the posttest questions 
are presented, thereby reducing the likelihood that participants could answer from memory and 
requiring participants to pay attention to each question. 
 Finally, the three types of intuition were not related to any of the five moral foundations. This 
observation may have implications relating to Haidt’s (2012) idea that intuition comes first and 
moral beliefs are later used as reasoning for a decision. Perhaps the types of intuition people rely on 
most do not influence the moral beliefs they use to justify their decisions. Future research should 
attempt to induced specific types of intuition (holistic, inferential, and affective) and measure which 
moral foundations are relied on the most when people are using these different types of intuition. 
Overall, intuition was not related to moral beliefs and different thinking styles did not appear to 
influence the moral foundations that people rely on when making decisions. Going forward, 
researchers should examine these conclusions further using different techniques and measures as 
these results could have applications for the type of environments critical decisions, such as 
decisions of war or decisions affecting an entire country, are made.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Harm/Care Foundation 20.571 4.778 ─ 91 91 91 91 80 80 80
2. Fairness/Cheating Foundation 19.978 4.377 .774** ─ 91 91 91 80 80 80
3. Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation 15.242 5.355 .500** .407** ─ 91 91 80 80 80
4. Authority/Subversion Foundation 15.758 5.280 .334** .288** .733** ─ 91 80 80 80
5. Sanctity/Degradation Foundation 13.835 5.556 .306** .164 .610** .630** ─ 80 80 80
6. Holistic Intuition 3.053 .521 .096 .016 -.031 -.172 -.226* ─ 80 80
7. Inferential Intuition 3.913 .375 .160 .307** .071 -.104 -.242* .325** ─ 80
8. Affective Intuition 3.028 .705 .452** .191 .081 .081 .145 .165 -.005 ─
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 2 
Predicting Moral Foundations and Types of Intuition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor β t-value Significance
Harm/Care Foundation Holistic Intuition -.036 -.333 .740
R
2
=.232 Inferential Intuition .174 1.630 .107
Affective Intuition .459 4.490 .000
Fairness/Cheating Foundation Holistic Intuition -.134 -1.176 .243
R
2
=.147 Inferential Intuition .351 3.129 .002
Affective Intuition .215 1.996 .049
Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation Holistic Intuition -.078 -.638 .525
R
2
=.017 Inferential Intuition .097 .801 .425
Affective Intuition .095 .818 .416
Authority/Subversion Foundation Holistic Intuition -.176 -1.457 .149
R
2
=.044 Inferential Intuition -.046 -.391 .697
Affective Intuition .110 .968 .336
Sanctity/Degredation Foundation Holistic Intuition -.198 -1.707 .092
R
2
=.113 Inferential Intuition -.176 -1.540 .128
Affective Intuition .177 1.610 .111
Holistic Intuition Harm/Care Foundation .178 1.126 .264
R
2
=.095 Fairness/Cheating Foundation -.166 -1.070 .288
Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation .183 1.143 .257
Authority/Subversion Foundation -.142 -.909 .366
Sanctity/Degredation Foundation -.273 -1.938 .056
Inferential Intuition Harm/Care Foundation -.091 -.602 .549
R
2
=.174 Fairness/Cheating Foundation .293 1.982 .051
Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation .266 1.739 .086
Authority/Subversion Foundation -.115 -.767 .445
Sanctity/Degredation Foundation -.283 -2.102 .039
Affective Intuition Harm/Care Foundation .631 4.406 .000
R
2
=.260 Fairness/Cheating Foundation -.185 -1.320 .191
Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation -.221 -1.527 .131
Authority/Subversion Foundation .164 1.156 .251
Sanctity/Degredation Foundation .105 .827 .411
*Bolded betas are significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Harm/Care Pretest 22 3.814 ─ 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 24
2. Fairness/Cheating Pretest 21.235 3.577 .602** ─ 34 34 34 34 34 34 24
3. Loyalty/Betrayal Pretest 15.441 3.807 -.048 -.455** ─ 34 34 34 34 34 24
4. Authority/Subversion Pretest 15.824 3.966 -.250 -.567** .694** ─ 34 34 34 34 24
5. Sanctity/Degradation Pretest 13.559 4.627 -.307 -.462** .644** .825** ─ 34 34 34 24
6. Holistic Intuition 21.088 3.370 .108 -.037 -.133 .006 .034 ─ 34 34 24
7. Inferential Intuition 30.765 3.358 .078 -.101 -.108 -.033 -.001 .345* ─ 34 24
8. Affective Intuition 25.971 4.988 -.167 .060 -.167 -.178 -.165 -.117 .180 ─ 24
9. Cognitive Reflection .222 .321 .206 .161 -.077 -.124 -.031 .231 .261 .216 ─
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 4 
Factorial ANOVAs on Moral Foundations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harm/Care Fairness/Cheating Loyalty/Betrayal Authority/Subversion Sanctity/Degradation
Λ, F(1,32) Λ, F(1,32) Λ, F(1,32) Λ, F(1,32) Λ, F(1,32)
Time 1, .000 .996, .132 .795, 8.244** .815, 7.248* .765, 9.815**
Condition 0, .180 0, .608 0, .329 0, .386 0, .005
Time X Condition .996, .126 .952, 1.622 .999, .037 .988, .401 .992, .245
*p <.05    **p <.01
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Appendix A 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following 
considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale: 
 
[0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong) 
[1] = not very relevant 
[2] = slightly relevant 
[3] = somewhat relevant 
[4] = very relevant 
[5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong) 
 
______1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally 
______2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
______3. Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
______4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority 
______5. Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
______6. Whether or not someone was good at math 
______7. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
______8. Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
______9. Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
______10. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society 
______11. Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
______12. Whether or not someone was cruel 
______13. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
______14. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
______15. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
______16. Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of 
 
Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
 
______17. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
______18. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
______19. I am proud of my country’s history. 
______20. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
______21. People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.  
______22. It is better to do good than to do bad. 
______23. One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. 
______24. Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
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______25. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something 
wrong.   
______26. Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
______27. I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
______28. It can never be right to kill a human being. 
______29. I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing. 
______30. It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
______31. If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey 
anyway because that is my duty. 
______32. Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
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Appendix B 
Types of Intuition Scale 
We are interested in how you make decisions and solve problems in your life. Read each of the 
following statements and rate the extent to which you would agree that that statement is true of you 
using the scale below. These items have no right or wrong answers; just respond based on what is 
true for you. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Definitely false Mostly false Undecided 
(neither true nor 
false) 
Mostly true Definitely true 
 
_____ 1. When tackling a new project, I concentrate on big ideas rather than the details. 
_____ 2. I trust my intuitions, especially in familiar situations.  
_____ 3. I prefer to use my emotional hunches to deal with a problem, rather than thinking about  it.  
_____ 4. Familiar problems can often be solved intuitively.  
_____ 5. There is a logical justification for most of my intuitive judgments.  
_____ 6. I rarely allow my emotional reactions to override logic.  
_____ 7. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.  
_____ 8. My intuitions come to me very quickly.  
_____ 9. I would rather think in terms of theories than facts.  
_____ 10. My intuitions are based on my experience.  
_____ 11. I often make decisions based on my gut feelings, even when the decision is contrary to 
 objective information. 
_____ 12. When working on a complex problem or decision I tend to focus on the details and 
 lose sight of the big picture.  
_____ 13. I believe in trusting my hunches.  
_____ 14. I prefer concrete facts over abstract theories.  
_____ 15. When making a quick decision in my area of expertise, I can justify the decision 
 logically.  
_____ 16. I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.  
_____ 17. If I have to, I can usually give reasons for my intuitions.  
_____ 18. I prefer to follow my head rather than my heart.  
_____ 19. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.  
_____ 20. I try to keep in mind the big picture when working on a complex problem.  
_____ 21. When I make intuitive decisions, I can usually explain the logic behind my decision. 
_____ 22. It is foolish to base important decisions on feelings.  
_____ 23. I am a “big picture” person.  
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Appendix C 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost? _____ cents. [Correct = 5 cents; Intuitive = 10 cents]  
 Were you familiar with the answer to this question before this study? Yes___No____ 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 
100 widgets? _____ minutes [Correct = 5 minutes; Intuitive = 100 minutes]  
 Were you familiar with the answer to this question before this study? Yes___No____ 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for 
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
_____ days [Correct = 47 days; Intuitive = 24 days] 
 Were you familiar with the answer to this question before this study? Yes___No____ 
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Appendix D 
Moral Scenarios 
Please indicate where on the scale you would fall when making a decision about the following 
scenarios. 
 
1. Imagine that you are in the Army. Your commanding officer tells you that you must leave an 
injured soldier behind in order to make it to your next destination on time. You know that this 
soldier is suffering and will likely die without any medical assistance. You decide to… 
 ____ follow the orders from your commanding officer 
 ____ 
 ____ 
 ____ help the injured soldier 
 
2. The state requires two local high school, School A and School B, to combine into one high school. 
The students from School A do not welcome the students from School B, take the best food from the 
cafeteria line so the students from School B do not get much to eat, and take up all of the outside 
tables so the students from School B are forced to sit inside. As a student from School A, you… 
____ participate in the activities of the School A students because you are loyal to your own 
school 
____ 
____ 
____ start a petition to guarantee that the students from School B are treated fairly and are 
able to enjoy all of the same amenities as the students of School B   
 
3. You are setting the table for your friends who are coming over for dinner. All of a sudden, you 
feel very sick and throw up on one of the plates. You wash the plate, but must set it on the table for 
dinner. You decide to… 
 ____ set the plate for one of your friends to use  
 ____ 
 ____ 
 ____ take the plate for yourself 
 
